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This Essay focuses on “transnational judicial governance”—that is, the 
regulation of transnational activity by domestic courts.
1
 Specifically, the 
Essay makes three points: First, transnational judicial governance is an 
important form of global governance that interacts with, but is distinct from, 
other forms of global governance such as international institutions, 
transgovernmental networks, and private governance. Second, it appears 
that the influence of U.S. courts in transnational judicial governance may be 
declining as the transnational litigation system becomes increasingly 
multipolar. Third, transnational judicial governance seems to be a 
normatively mixed bag. But, for better or worse, it is likely that domestic 
courts will continue to play an important role in global governance. 
 
I. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE AND OTHER FORMS OF GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Legal scholars and political scientists have devoted considerable 
attention to the role of domestic courts in domestic governance,
2
 as well as 
to the role of international courts in global governance.
3
 So far, however, 
                                                 
*
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economic regulation. 
1
 See Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 67, 71 (2009) [hereinafter Whytock, Domestic Courts] (defining “transnational 
judicial governance”).   
2
 Examples of scholarship on the role of domestic courts in domestic governance 
include RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, 
AND JUDICIALIZATION (2002); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate 
& Torbjörn Vallinder eds., 1995); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
3
 Examples of scholarship on the role of international courts in global governance 
include KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 219–20 (2001) (emphasizing the 
role of the European Court of Justice in European governance); COURTS CROSSING 
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they have devoted little attention to the role of domestic courts in global 
governance.
4
 Yet domestic courts are routinely involved in the regulation of 
transnational activity.
5
 This section briefly discusses the important, but 
often neglected, role of domestic courts in global governance, and 
highlights the relationship between transnational judicial governance and 
other forms of global governance. 
 
A.  The Global Governance Functions of Domestic Courts 
 
Domestic courts perform two basic global governance functions: they 
allocate authority to regulate transnational activity (a jurisdictional 
function), and they determine rights and obligations of transnational actors 
(a substantive function). These functions correspond to two fundamental 




                                                                                                                            
BORDERS: BLURRING LINES OF SOVEREIGNTY (Mary L. Volcansek & John F. Stack, Jr., 
eds., 2005) (reviewing the role of international courts in world politics); Wayne Sandholtz 
& Alec Stone Sweet, LAW, POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, in THE POLITICS 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 238 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (discussing global 
governance implications of the European Court of Justice). 
4
 But see, e.g., Sarah Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law: 
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 
INT’L ORG. 745 (2011) (positing a link between domestic courts’ application of 
extraterritorial law and national policy implementation in other countries); Tonya L. 
Putnam, Courts Without Borders: Domestic Sources of U.S. Extraterritoriality in the 
Regulatory Sphere, 63 INT’L ORG. 459 (2009) (exploring how domestic courts have come 
to regulate persons and conduct outside their states’ borders by claiming jurisdiction over 
transactions with local and extraterritorial elements); Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra 
note 1, at 75 (emphasizing two main functions of domestic courts in global governance: 
allocating authority among states and determining rights and obligations of transnational 
actors). 
5
 A closely related point is that the private international law (or “conflict of laws”) 
principles applied by domestic courts play an important role in global governance. See 
Karen Knop et al., Forward, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2008) (noting “connection 
between private international law and global governance . . . that is largely ignored by 
insider experts”); Horatia Muir-Watt, Private International Law as Global Governance: 
Beyond the Schize, from Closet to Planet 7 (2011) (noting “governance potential of private 
international law”), available at http://works.bepress.com/horatia_muir-watt/1; Christopher 
A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
719, 735–43 (2009) [hereinafter Whytock, Myth of Mess] (analyzing global governance 
functions of international choice of law). 
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1. Who Governs? Allocation of Global Governance Authority 
 
Transnational activity by definition has connections to more than one 
state—either because citizens of more than one state are involved or 
because the activity or its effects occur in more than one state’s territory.
6
 
These multi-state connections mean that more than one state may claim the 
authority to govern that activity.
7
 Which of these states should govern? This 
“who governs” question has three basic dimensions, corresponding to three 
different types of governance authority: prescriptive authority (Which 
state’s laws should govern particular transnational activity?), adjudicative 
authority (Which state’s courts should adjudicate disputes arising out of that 
activity?), and enforcement authority (Which state should enforce a law or 
court decision that applies to transnational activity?).
8
 
Domestic courts help answer these questions. For example, when U.S. 
courts decide whether to apply U.S. statutes extraterritorially, or when they 
make international choice-of-law decisions, they help allocate prescriptive 
authority.
9
 When they decide whether to assert personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant or whether to grant a forum non conveniens motion to dismiss a 
suit in favor of a foreign court, they help allocate adjudicative authority.
10
 
And when they decide whether to give extraterritorial effect to subpoenas 
issued by U.S. regulatory agencies or injunctions issued by U.S. courts, they 
help allocate enforcement authority.
11
 
                                                 
6
 See STEVEN VERTOVEC, TRANSNATIONALISM 2 (Routledge ed., 2009) (discussing the 
“cross-border relationships, patterns of exchange, affiliations and social formations 
spanning nation-states” and how the growth of interest in transnationalism parallels the 
growth of social scientific interest in globalization over the same period).  
7
 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Building Capacity for the Transnational Regulation of 
Migration, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010) (examining the U.S.-Mexico relationship and 
conflicting interests in controlling governance of transnational activity, particularly drug 
trafficking and other cross-border crimes). 
8
 These three types of governance authority correspond to the three basic categories of 
jurisdiction under international law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987) (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as a state’s 
jurisdiction “to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or 
the interests of persons in things”; adjudicative jurisdiction as a state’s jurisdiction “to 
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals”; and 
enforcement jurisdiction as a state’s jurisdiction “to induce or compel compliance or to 
punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations”). 
9
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 80–81 (explaining that domestic 
courts help allocate prescriptive authority by deciding whether to apply domestic law 
extraterritorially and by making international choice-of-law decisions).   
10
 See id. at 77–80 (explaining how courts help allocate adjudicative authority by 
applying personal jurisdiction doctrine, the forum non conveniens doctrine, and other 
doctrines). 
11
 See id. at 81–83 (explaining how courts help allocate enforcement authority); see 
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In addition to this “horizontal” inter-state dimension of allocation, 
domestic courts help allocate governance authority “vertically” between 
domestic and international institutions. For example, when U.S. courts 
decide whether a treaty is self-executing, whether to recognize a principle of 
customary international law, or whether to give priority to domestic or 
international law in the event of a conflict between the two, they help 
allocate governance authority along this domestic-international dimension.
12
 
Domestic courts also help allocate governance authority along a third, 
private-public dimension. For example, by determining whether to apply 
non-state norms such as commercial usages or lex mercatoria on the one 
hand, or state law on the other hand, they influence whether private or 
public rules will govern transnational activity; and by determining whether 
to enforce an arbitration agreement, they can influence whether a private 




In summary, domestic courts perform a jurisdictional global governance 
function by helping to allocate three types of governance authority over 
transnational activity: prescriptive authority, adjudicative authority, and 
enforcement authority. They do so along three dimensions: between states, 
between domestic and international institutions, and between private and 
public actors. Globalization entails increased transnational activity over 
which multiple states may have legitimate claims to govern.
14
 Moreover, 
with the spread of international law and international courts, there are 
difficult choices to make about whether they or domestic institutions should 
govern particular transnational activity. Likewise, with private actors 
                                                                                                                            
also FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315–17 
(D.C.Cir. 1980) (explaining the limitations on courts’ enforcement jurisdiction and the 
distinction between the power to create laws that prescribe certain conduct and the 
authority to enforce those prescriptive rules); S.E.C. v. Sabhlok, 2009 WL 3561523, at *5–
6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009) (recognizing limitations on jurisdiction to enforce a Walsh Act 
subpoena).   
12
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 83–88 (explaining how these 
decisions help allocate authority along this vertical dimension).  
13
 See id. at 89–90 (explaining how these decisions help allocate authority between 
state and non-state actors). See also Jones v. Sea Tow Servs. Freeport NY Inc., 30 F.3d 
360, 366 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing an order compelling arbitration, finding it improper 
where an arbitration clause selected English law and an English forum, both parties were 
U.S. citizens, and the vessel in question was salvaged from U.S. waters); see also 
Matabang v. Carnival Corp., 630 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366–67 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying a 
motion to compel arbitration ). 
14
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that “[b]ecause 
transnational activity by definition has connections to more than one state, more than one 
state may have a basis for legitimately exercising the authority to govern it”). 
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increasingly claiming authority to govern transnational activity traditionally 
governed by states, the allocation of governance authority between private 
and public institutions also poses serious challenges.
15
 As a result, the 
jurisdictional function of domestic courts in global governance is likely to 
be of growing importance. 
 
2. Who Gets What? Determination of Rights and Obligations of 
Transnational Actors 
 
It is well understood that domestic courts are important in domestic 
governance not only because they resolve discrete disputes—itself a critical 
governance function—but also because when they do so, they contribute to 
the authoritative allocation of resources within a society.
16
 Domestic courts 
perform a similar function in global governance by determining rights and 
obligations of transnational actors.
17
 
Neither legal scholars nor political scientists have systematically 
explored the implications of this judicial function for global governance. 
But existing research on three types of transnational litigation demonstrates 
its importance. In transnational regulatory litigation, domestic courts apply 
domestic regulatory norms to determine rights and obligations of 
transnational actors.
18
 In transnational public law litigation, “[p]rivate 
individuals, government officials, and nations sue one another directly, and 
are sued directly, in a variety of judicial fora, most prominently, domestic 
courts,” based on rights derived from both domestic and international law.
19
 
And in transnational private litigation, domestic courts resolve transnational 
disputes under different states’ private law rules—such as rules governing 
torts, contracts and property—rules that reflect these states’ respective 
distributive and regulatory policies.
20
 
                                                 
15
 See THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 4–7 
(Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002) (highlighting the rise of private 
power in global governance). 
16
 See Martin Shapiro, From Public Law to Public Policy, or the “Public” in “Public 
Law,” 5 POL. SCI. & POL. 410, 413 (1972) (discussing “judicial allocation of values”); see 
also Robert M. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 911 (1979) 
(noting that courts both solve disputes and distribute resources). 
17
 See Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: 
Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 281, 321 (1999) (illustrating how 
domestic courts can determine rights and obligations of transnational actors in the human 
rights context). 
18
 See generally Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 251 (2006) (defining and discussing transnational regulatory litigation). 
19
 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2347 (1991) (defining and discussing transnational public law litigation). 
20
 See generally Robert Wai, Transnational Private Litigation and Transnational 
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Notwithstanding the differences between these different types of 
transnational litigation, in all three contexts one sees domestic courts 
performing a substantive global governance function: the determination of 
rights and obligations in ways that contribute to the authoritative allocation 
of resources among transnational actors.
21
 In this way, domestic courts help 
answer a second fundamental question of global governance: Who gets 
what? 
 
B.  The Transnational Shadow of the Law: Strategic Behavior and Other 
Forms of Global Governance 
 
The global governance functions of domestic courts are important not 
only because of their impact on litigants, but also because of their influence 
beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular disputes.
22
 Extending 





1. Transnational Judicial Governance and the Strategic Behavior of 
Transnational Actors 
 
For example, domestic court decisions can affect the strategic behavior 
of transnational actors. Prior court decisions influence actors’ expectations 
about future court decisions. Because the strategic behavior of transnational 
actors often depends on their expectations about future domestic court 
decisions regarding their activity, domestic court decisions can influence 
                                                                                                                            
Governance, in CRITICIZING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 243 (Markus Lederer & Philipp S. 
Müller eds. 2005) (defining and discussing transnational private litigation). 
21
 See Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering In a Contested 
Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 471, 474 (2005) (discussing how domestic courts 
redistribute resources between actors in private litigation); Whytock, Domestic Courts, 
supra note 1, at 91–96 (arguing that one of the basic global governance functions of 
domestic courts is the determination of rights and obligations of transnational actors).  
22 
See Buxbaum, supra note 18, at 254 (arguing that domestic courts influence the 
transnational process on a global scale by recognizing and enforcing international norms); 
Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, and the Transnational Shadow of the 
Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 449, 453 (2008) (arguing that “transnational litigation is 
the foundation of a form of global governance, whereby judges make decisions that not 
only directly affect the parties to particular disputes, but also indirectly regulate the 
behavior of actors who engage in activity in the transnational shadow of the law”).  
23
 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951, 972–73 (1979) (describing the “shadow of the 
law” concept in domestic context); Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at pt. III 
(extending concept to transnational activity). 
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that activity.
24
 For example, international choice-of-law decisions by 
domestic courts can influence transnational activity by helping transnational 
actors determine which state’s laws would be applied to their activity in the 
event of litigation—and, in the same way, these decisions can facilitate 
bargaining among transnational actors.
25
 Similarly, the personal jurisdiction 
and forum non conveniens decisions of a particular state’s domestic courts 
can influence forum shopping behavior by shaping litigants’ expectations 




2. The Relationship Between Transnational Judicial Governance and Other 
Types of Global Governance 
 
Of course, transnational judicial governance is only one possible 
method of global governance. But the transnational shadow of the law 
extends to other forms of governance. The most familiar (even if not the 
most pervasive) approach to global governance involves international 
institutions, such as international law (e.g. the law of the sea), international 
organizations (e.g. the United Nations), and international courts (e.g. the 
International Court of Justice).
27
 
Another method of global governance consists of transgovernmental 
networks between the regulatory agencies of different states.
28
 
                                                 
24
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 98–101 (explaining impact of 
domestic court decisions on the strategic behavior of transnational actors). See also Samuel 
P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. PA. INT’L ECON. L. 1297, 
1306 (2004) (discussing the interplay between lawmaking and transnational actors and how 
procedural choices of courts can influence transnational activity).  
25
 See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5, at 742; see also Ralf Michaels, Two 
Economists, Three Opinions? Economic Models for Private International Law - Cross-
Border Torts as Example, in AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
143, 156 (Jurgen Basedow & Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006) (noting that the predictability of 
applicable law may enable parties to either settle in light of the particular applicable law or 
litigate regardless of the choice of law). 
26
 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 481, 487 (2011) [hereinafter Whytock, Forum Shopping] (explaining that, other 
things being equal, plaintiffs are more likely to file in a particular court if they expect that 
the particular court will make a favorable court access ruling). 
27
 See Jose E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-maker, 31 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591 (2005) (emphasizing the importance and “practical significance” 
of international organizations in global governance); see also Katrina C. Szakal,  Manual 
on International Courts and Tribunals, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 858, 858 (2000) 
(observing that international adjudicatory authorities have jurisdiction over a variety of 
areas of law and that use of these authorities to resolve international disputes has become 
increasingly common). 
28
 See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of 
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 216 (2003) (discussing the 
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Transgovernmental networks are “pattern[s] of regular and purposive 
relations among like government units working across . . . borders.”
29
 An 
example of a transgovernmental network is the active cooperative 
relationship between antitrust authorities in the United States and the 
European Union.
30
 Transnational judicial governance itself may sometimes 
take the form of transgovernmental networks, particularly at the highest 
levels of national judiciaries.
31
 However, it is likely that most domestic 
judges—especially the busy trial court judges on the front lines of 
transnational litigation—usually will have insufficient time and resources to 
actively participate in networks of regular and purposive relations with their 
foreign counterparts.
32
 Therefore, it is likely that most transnational judicial 
governance occurs outside the context of transgovernmental networks. 
A third approach to global governance is private global governance, 
whereby private actors regulate transnational activity.
33
 For example, 
private actors play an important role in international standard setting,
34
 and 
                                                                                                                            
reasons transgovernmental networks are often thought to be the most efficient means of 
global governance). See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 
(2004) (describing transgovernmental networks). 
29
 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 28, at 14 (defining transgovernmental networks as 
regular and constructive relations among like governments working across borders).   
30
 See Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of Transgovernmentalism: 
The Case of E.U.-U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 39–43 (2005) 
(explaining the transgovernmental relationship between antitrust authorities in the United 
States and the European Union). 
31
 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 28, at 34 (discussing transgovernmental networks of 
judges). 
32
 However, U.S. bankruptcy judges sometimes directly engage with their foreign 
counterparts in global bankruptcy cases. See id. at 94–96 (noting that U.S. bankruptcy 
judges sometimes directly engage with their foreign counterparts in global bankruptcy 
cases). 
33
 See Morton Ougaard, Private Institutions and Business Power in Global 
Governance, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 387, 387 (2008)  (noting the influence private 
actors have on global governance and standard setting). See generally Special Issue, 
Private Regulation in the Global Economy, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3 (2010), 
http://www.bepress .com/bap/vol12/iss3/ (conceptualizing and describing examples of 
private governance). 
34
 See Eyal Benvenisti, The Move from Institutions? Substituting International Law, 
100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 289, 292 (2006) (discussing instances where private actors 
have coordinated to regulate international action); THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE 
AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 15 (discussing the increased influence 
private actors have on international governance standards). See generally Tim Büthe & 
Walter Mattli, Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making in the 
Public Interest, 18 GOVERNANCE 399 (2005) (analyzing private global standard setting in 
accounting). 
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private arbitral institutions offer dispute resolution services that are widely 
used by transnational actors.
35
 
Even combined, these methods of global governance do not extend to 
all transnational activity. But activity to which these international, 
transgovernmental and private governance methods do not extend are not 
necessarily ungoverned. To the contrary, they may be governed by domestic 
law—and when this is the case, domestic courts, as explained above, can 
help determine which state’s domestic law governs.
36
 Even when one of 
these three methods of global governance do apply to particular 
transnational activity, they may overlap with domestic regulations—here, 
too, domestic courts can play a significant role by allocating authority along 
the domestic-international dimension or the private-public dimension.
37
  In 
these ways, domestic courts can help fill global governance gaps and 
resolve governance conflicts. 
More fundamentally, these other methods of global governance depend 
significantly on domestic courts for their effectiveness.
38
 For example, 
domestic courts can support efforts to govern through international 
institutions by contributing to the development of international law;
39
 and 
they can support (or limit) those efforts by enforcing (or declining to 
enforce) international law and the judgments of international courts.
40
 
                                                 
35
 See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS & 
JUDICIALIZATION 334 (2002) (noting that private parties increasingly use private arbitration 
to resolve disputes that arise from trans-border commercial activity); Christopher A. 
Whytock, Private-Public Interaction in Global Governance: The Case of Transnational 
Commercial Arbitration, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, 5–8 (2010), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol12/iss3/art10/ [hereinafter Whytock, Private-Public 
Interaction] (empirically documenting the rise of transnational commercial arbitration). 
36
 See supra Part I.A.1. 
37
 See supra Part I.A.1; see also Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” 
Schools: Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic 
Courts, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 455, 458 (2007) (discussing the importance of domestic courts 
in the transnational legal process). 
38
 For a more detailed discussion of how domestic courts can support (or hinder) other 
methods of global governance, see Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 103–14. 
39
 See BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 104 (René Provost trans., 1993) (noting that domestic courts add a greater 
body of case law to the interpretation of treaties than do international tribunals); see also 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 
99, 137 (1994) (positing that a unified commitment by judicial institutions is more likely to 
establish international rule of law than a single international court). 
40
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 104–11 (explaining how domestic 
courts can support or hinder governance through international law and international 
courts); see also Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: the Role of 
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 487, 501 (2005) (finding that participation of domestic courts in the transnational 
judicial dialogue plays a significant role in the creation of international legal norms). 
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Insofar as domestic courts are involved in the interpretation, application and 
review of the regulations and other decisions of government agencies that 
are part of transgovernmental networks, domestic courts can provide 
support for those networks. And domestic courts support private global 
governance by interpreting and enforcing transnational contracts.
41
 In 
particular, they provide critical support for the transnational commercial 
arbitration system by enforcing arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.
42
 
Of course, these alternative forms of governance do not rely entirely or 
necessarily even primarily on domestic courts. But domestic courts can 
enhance the effectiveness of these alternative methods by providing 
support, and can sometimes hinder them by withholding support. 
In summary, the effects of domestic court decisions in transnational 
litigation radiate beyond borders and beyond the parties to particular 
lawsuits.
43
 Domestic courts not only influence the strategic behavior of 
transnational actors, but also provide support for other methods of global 
governance, including international institutions, transgovernmental 
networks, and private governance. 
 
II. INCREASING MULTIPOLARITY IN TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL 
GOVERNANCE? 
 
What is the role of the United States in transnational judicial 
governance? The conventional wisdom is that, for a variety of reasons, the 
United States is the leading provider of courts and law for transnational 
disputes, perhaps along with England. Thus, the general impression seems 
to be that the transnational litigation system is unipolar, or perhaps bipolar. 
This would imply that the United States is among the most influential 
participants in transnational judicial governance. 
But several empirical trends seem to indicate that other countries are 
playing an increasingly influential role in the transnational litigation system.  
                                                 
41
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 111–14 (explaining how domestic 
courts can support or hinder governance through private institutions, including private 
contracting and transnational arbitration). 
42
 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Penn State Law Review Symposium: Building the 
Civilization of Arbitration: Private Ordering and International Commercial Arbitration, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2009) (arguing that public courts play an important role 
in the process of enforcing international arbitration awards);
 
Whytock, Private-Public 
Interaction, supra note 35, at 18–22  (explaining how domestic courts help solve 
enforcement problems in transnational commercial arbitration). 
43
 Cf. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT 
COURTS 117, 121 (Keith O. Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983) (referring to “[t]he 
[r]adiating [e]ffects of [c]ourts” in the domestic context). 
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These trends suggest that compared to other states, the influence of the 
United States in transnational judicial governance may be declining. 
First, according to data collected by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts, alienage litigation—that is, transnational litigation over which 
federal subject matter jurisdiction exists because the suit is between a U.S. 
citizen and a foreign citizen—is declining.
44
 Transnational tort claims are 
declining, which would seem to suggest less ex post forum shopping into 
U.S. courts by plaintiffs;
45
 and transnational contract claims are likewise 
declining, which would seem to suggest fewer ex ante forum selection 
clauses favoring U.S. courts.
46
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
J.M. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
47
—which rejected personal 
jurisdiction in a suit by a U.S. plaintiff against a foreign defendant for an 
injury caused in New Jersey by a machine manufactured by the 
defendant
48
—suggests that this trend will continue. 
Second, there is evidence of a growing number of foreign judgments 
being brought to the United States for enforcement. Unfortunately, there is 
not good data on foreign judgment enforcement in the United States. But 
analysis of opinions published in Westlaw by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York indicates an overall upward trend between 
1990 and 2009.
49
 This trend is consistent with the observations of 
transnational litigators who have identified foreign judgment enforcement 
as a growing field of legal practice in the United States.
50
 If there is indeed 
an increase in foreign judgments, this would seem to suggest an underlying 
                                                 
44
 See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in 
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. 
INT’L L. 31, 34 (2011) (illustrating in a chart that alienage suits involving torts and contract 
claims have experienced an overall decline in the period from 1996 to 2005). 
45
 Whytock, Forum Shopping, supra note 26, at 510–11 (emphasizing that if there is a 
wave of foreign plaintiffs in the U.S. federal court system, it is not a result of alienage 
claims). 
46
 See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 33 (stating that “the decline in 
transnational contract claims suggests that the world’s commercial actors may be 
negotiating fewer forum selection clauses that provide for litigation in the United States.”). 
47
 131 U.S. 2780, 2792 (2011). 
48
 Id. (concluding that New Jersey did not have personal jurisdiction over petitioner). 
49
 See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 36–37. 
50
 See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 1078 (4th ed. 2007) (noting “increasingly frequent efforts by 
courts and legislatures around the world to impose substantial judgments against 
companies perceived to have the wherewithal to pay them”); see also Press Release, 
Gibson Dunn Launches Transnational Litigation and Foreign Judgments Practice Group, 
Dec. 15, 2010, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/news/Pages/GibsonDunn 
LaunchesTransnationalLitigationandForeignPracticeGroup (announcing the creation of a 
new practice group focused on representing clients in foreign judgment enforcement 
actions).  
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increase in transnational litigation in foreign courts. Moreover, this trend 
would suggest that if U.S. courts in some ways function as “world courts,”
51
 
they may increasingly be perceived less as the world’s trial courts and more 
as the world’s appellate courts as they review the judgments of foreign 
courts to decide whether they are enforceable.
52
 
Third, there is evidence that U.S. courts are applying the law of other 
countries with increasing frequency. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
recent empirical analysis suggests that U.S. judges making international 
choice-of-law decisions are not systematically biased in favor of U.S. law.
53
 
Moreover, an analysis of decisions of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York shows a steady increase since 1990 in the 
number of references to Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which is the rule governing determinations of foreign law.
54
 This trend 
suggests that even when U.S. courts do adjudicate transnational disputes, 
foreign law is increasingly being applied to govern the underlying 
transnational activity. 
These are just snapshots of discrete trends—but together they provide 
some support for the conjecture that transnational judicial governance has 




                                                 
51
 See Ralf Michaels, U.S. Courts as World Courts, 12 WASEDA PROCEEDINGS OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (2009), available at  http://wine.wul.waseda.ac.jp/record=b2576729 
*eng. 
52
 Cf. Society of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (expressing concern that by reviewing foreign judgments too closely, U.S. 
courts risk “in effect giv[ing] the judgment [debtor] a further appeal on the merits”). 
Ordinarily, however, the review of foreign judgments by U.S. courts is far less searching 
than appellate review of lower court decisions within the U.S. legal system. See generally 
Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra B. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, pt. I.B (2011) (discussing 
the judgment enforcement doctrine). 
53
 See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5, at 764–69 (providing empirical evidence 
suggesting that U.S. judges are not biased in favor of domestic law in their international 
choice-of-law decisions).  
54
 See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 44, at 38 (empirically documenting this 
increase). Rule 44.1 provides as follows: “A party who intends to raise an issue about a 
foreign country’s law must give notice by a pleading or other writing. In determining 
foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, 
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
The court’s determination must be treated as a ruling on a question of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
44.1. 
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III. TRANSNATIONAL JUDICIAL GOVERNANCE: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? 
 
Is it a good thing that domestic courts play an important role in global 
governance? On the one hand, at least in the more “high politics” world of 
foreign relations law, there are plausible arguments to be made that courts 
are not institutionally well suited to get involved in transnational matters. 
On the other hand, empirical research suggests that U.S. district court 
judges do a surprisingly good job applying frustratingly vague principles of 
transnational litigation, including choice-of-law principles and the forum 
non conveniens doctrine.
55
 Empirical evidence also suggests that while 
generally staying true to the U.S. Supreme Court’s pro-enforcement policy 
in arbitration, U.S. judges also appear to take seriously their role in 
supervising the transnational arbitration system.
56
 Moreover, U.S. judges do 
not appear to carry out these governance functions in a manner that is 
strongly influenced by partisan or ideological biases.
57
 This is not to say 
that domestic courts are necessarily the best suited institutions for making 
global governance decisions. But in the absence of other governance 
institutions—international, transgovernmental or private—transnational 
judicial governance may end up filling some of the gaps.
58
 
Second, aside from whether transnational judicial governance in general 
is a good thing, is increased multipolarity in transnational judicial 
governance—the trend suggested in Part II—a good thing?  On the one 
hand, from a U.S. perspective, one might lament a decline in the influence 
of U.S. courts and U.S. law in global governance. On the other hand, this 
may be seen as good news for other states that previously exerted relatively 
little influence in the governance of transnational activity. Moreover, 
                                                 
55
 See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5, at 790 (arguing that judges do a better job 
at applying choice of law principles than many scholars assume); see also Whytock, Forum 
Shopping, supra note 30, at 528 (concluding that “judges apply the forum non conveniens 
doctrine fairly well”). 
56
 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Arbitration-Litigation Relationship in 
Transnational Dispute Resolution: Empirical Insights from the U.S. Federal Courts, 2 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 39, 80–81 (2008) (suggesting that courts supervise 
arbitration in a manner that helps reinforce arbitration’s status as the leading method of 
transnational dispute resolution). 
57
 See Whytock, Myth of Mess, supra note 5 at 777–78 (presenting statistics showing 
that even if ideological factors influence judge’s choice-of-law decisions, the influence is 
rather small when compared to other factors); see also Whytock, Forum Shopping System, 
supra note 26 at 525–26 (finding that a judge’s ideology may affect the factors emphasized 
in a forum non conveniens decision, but that ideology does not appear to have a strong 
impact on the probability of dismissal in general).  
58
 See Whytock, Domestic Courts, supra note 1, at 88 (discussing the increasingly 
prevalent role domestic courts will play in the absence of supranational governance 
institutions). 
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business-oriented interest groups, like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
have been fighting for years to reduce the flow of transnational litigation 
into U.S. courts and limit the application of U.S. tort law to transnational 
activity because of concerns about the negative impact on U.S. and U.S.-
based businesses.
59
 For them, perhaps the declining role of the United States 
might be viewed as good news. But it is far from clear that these businesses 
will ultimately find foreign courts and foreign law more beneficial.
60
 
The bottom line is that, for better or worse, domestic courts play an 
important role in global governance, and it is likely that they will continue 
to do so even if the influence of U.S. courts is declining. It is therefore 
important for legal scholars, political scientists and policymakers to develop 
a better understanding of transnational judicial governance. 
  
                                                 
59
 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE GLOBALISATION OF CLASS 
ACTIONS: SAFEGUARDS TO CURB LITIGATION ABUSE 1–6, (2008), available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research/safeguardsp
aper.pdf (proposing legal reforms to limit the abuse of transnational class action lawsuits 
against U.S. businesses). 
60
 See Michael D. Goldhaber, Forum Shopper’s Remorse, CORP. COUNS., Apr. 1, 2010, 
available at http://www.corpcounsel.com (describing how defendants sometimes regret 
having forum-shopped into foreign legal systems); Whytock & Robertson, supra note 52, 
at 1448–49 (explaining possible reasons for this trend). 
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